Reuters & Agence France-Press & Al-Monitor & International Crisis Center – 2017-02-03 01:07:10
Deadly US Raid May Bolster Yemen’s al Qaeda – Crisis Group
(February 2, 2017) — A commando raid approved by new US President Donald Trump this week may have given al Qaeda in Yemen a propaganda boost in killing civilians, the International Crisis Group (ICG) said in a report on Thursday.
Local medics said 30 people including 10 women and children were killed in the helicopter-born Navy SEAL attack on a cluster of houses in Yemen’s southern al-Bayda province.
Al Qaeda said in a statement that a senior leader and an unspecified number of other militants were killed. One US soldier died in the assault, and a Pentagon spokesman alleged some of the women were firing at the US force.
“The raid . . . is a good example of what not to do,” ICG’s senior Arabian Pensinsula analyst April Alley wrote.
“The use of US troops and the high number of civilian casualties . . . are deeply inflammatory and breed anti-American resentment across the Yemeni political spectrum that works to the advantage of AQAP,” she added.
Nearly two years of civil war in the impoverished Arabian Peninsula country has allowed local branches of al Qaeda and Islamic State to expand and carry out new attacks within Yemen.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is one of the global militant group’s most active branches. It unsuccessfully plotted to blow up US-bound airliners and claimed responsibility for a 2015 shooting at the satirical Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris.
Former President Barack Obama repeatedly killed top leaders in the organization with unmanned drone attacks but, ICG said, that strategy may not ultimately defeat it.
“It is too early to determine what, if any, broader strategy the Trump administration has in Yemen . . . (But drone strikes) have failed to stop its rapid growth — in large part because the opportunities provided by the war outstrip its losses.”
Writing By Noah Browning; editing by Ralph Boulton)
Qaeda Stands to Gain from Trump Strikes on Yemen
Agence France-Press & Al-Monitor
(February 2, 2017) — Washington is also facing questions on whether an eight-year-old American girl was killed in the raid. Local sources say the girl was the daughter of senior Al-Qaeda cleric and US citizen Anwar al-Awlaqi, killed in a 2011 US drone strike.
Under Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama, the US dramatically increased its use of drone strikes against suspected jihadists in Yemen.
The Pentagon said Monday that “a lot of female combatants” were caught up in Sunday’s battle. Women were among the fatalities, it said, declining to specify whether children were also killed. The death toll was still being evaluated, it said.
On the ground, a Yemeni provincial official gave a toll of 41 suspected militants and 16 civilians killed, eight of them women and eight children. The US raid was said to have targeted the houses of three tribal chiefs linked to Al-Qaeda.
The provincial official said Apache helicopters also hit a school, a mosque and a medical facility, which were all used by Al-Qaeda militants.
AQAP said in a statement that 30 people died in the raid — “only women and children. . . with some tribal leaders who have no connections” to the group.
The conflict in Yemen escalated two years ago when a Saudi-led Arab coalition launched air raids against Iran-backed Shiite Huthi rebels, who had taken over the capital and seized swathes of the country’s centre and north.
The war has allowed both AQAP and IS jihadists to gain ground in the impoverished nation.
The United Nations estimates over three million people have been displaced since fighting between the Huthis and pro-government forces broke out in 2014.
The Arab world’s poorest country now faces a major humanitarian crisis, with one and a half million children suffering severe malnutrition.
Yemen’s Al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base
The International Crisis Group
The Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda (AQ) is stronger than it has ever been. As the country’s civil war has escalated and become regionalised, its local franchise, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is thriving in an environment of state collapse, growing sectarianism, shifting alliances, security vacuums and a burgeoning war economy.
Reversing this trend requires ending the conflict that set it in motion. This means securing an overarching political settlement that has buy-in from the country’s diverse constituencies, including Sunni Islamists.
As this will take time, steps must be taken now to contain AQAP’s growth: improving governance in vulnerable areas, disaggregating Sunni Islamist groups and using military tools judiciously and in coordination with local authorities.
These efforts will be imperiled if states interested in fighting AQAP and Yemen’s nascent Islamic State (IS) branch, such as the US, take military actions that ignore the local context and result in high civilian casualties, like the Trump administration’s 29 January 2017 raid on AQAP affiliates in al-Bayda, or fail to restrain partners who tolerate or even encourage AQAP/IS activities.
Prior to Yemen’s 2011 popular uprising against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, AQAP was a small yet lethal branch of AQ, focused primarily on Western targets. With at most several hundred members, it had limited local appeal and was both sustained and constrained by complex and sometimes contradictory relationships with the governing authorities and tribes.
A primary security concern for the West and especially the US, AQAP was a sideshow for most Yemenis, at times tolerated by the government and routinely used by local elites for financial and/or political advantage. It was far less threatening to state stability than growing regime infighting, southern separatist sentiment or Huthi militancy in northern areas.
AQAP and, later and to a much lesser extent, a new outcrop of IS, emerged arguably as the biggest winners of the failed political transition and civil war that followed. AQAP adapted to the rapidly shifting political terrain, morphing into an insurgent movement capable of controlling territory and challenging state authority.
Its main success derives from its demonstrated pragmatism: working within local norms, forging alliances with Sunni allies, assimilating into militias and embedding itself in a political economy of smuggling and trade that spans the various fighting factions, including the Huthi/former President Saleh alliance.
It has at times controlled territory in the country’s south and appears ever more embedded in the fabric of opposition to the Huthi/Saleh alliance, dominant in the north, that is fighting the internationally recognised, Saudi-backed interim government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
IS, with its more brutal tactics, has been less successful in gaining recruits or capturing territory, but war has opened space for it to operate in places that have experienced sectarian-tinged violence, such as the southern port city of Aden.
There, the group has turned its sights on the Hadi government and local security personnel through assassinations and bombings that have, indirectly, benefited the Huthi/Saleh front by weakening its common enemies and repeatedly underscoring the lack of security in Aden, the government’s temporary capital.
Virtually all local and foreign fighting parties in Yemen claim to be enemies of AQAP and IS, yet all have contributed to their rise. The Huthis, who as Zaydi/Shiites are AQAP’s primary ideological enemies, strengthened their foes through their February 2015 military push into predominantly Shafai (Sunni) areas, allowing AQAP to present itself as part of a wider “Sunni” front against Huthi/Saleh expansion.
The Huthi/Saleh bloc’s willingness to conflate the Sunni Islamist party Islah and southern separatists with AQ and IS does not help. Their opponents, especially a gamut of Salafi fighting groups that the war has pushed to the foreground, as well as their Gulf backers, have poured fuel on the fire, at times crudely labelling Huthis as Iranian proxies who are part of a “Shiite agenda” in the region.
The logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, coupled with a long legacy of politicians using jihadists in power struggles against foes, has allowed AQAP to forge tacit alliances with a range of anti-Huthi/Saleh forces.
The Saudi-backed coalition’s almost single-minded focus on defeating the Huthi/Saleh bloc has been a boon to AQAP, which has controlled territory unimpeded for stretches of time, in the process indirectly gaining weapons from the coalition and mining new funding streams by raiding banks and controlling ports.
The United Arab Emirates dislodged AQAP from its Mukalla stronghold in April 2016, but such successes are fragile and could easily be reversed in the absence of more effective and inclusive governance.
The evolution of AQAP into an insurgent force with the ambition and capacity to govern territory, showing pragmatism and sensitivity to local concerns, does not negate the international risk posed by the group.
AQ’s long-game strategy, combined with the immediate benefits from Yemen’s war, means that it, along with its local affiliates, will likely outlast the swift global rise of IS and its Yemeni subsidiary, which has pursued a more aggressive approach.
The continuation of an increasingly fractured conflict greatly enhances AQAP’s unprecedented ability to expand local support and amass financial and military resources. Countering its gains poses a complex long-term challenge and will require an urgent yet measured response, focused on bringing the civil war to a negotiated end.
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