The Institute for Public Accuracy & Michael T. Klare / The Nation & Reuters & The National Security Archive – 2018-07-16 01:10:45
Trump-Putin Should Answer Ronald Reagan’s Question:
“Why Wait to Eliminate all Nuclear Weapons?”
The Institute for Public Accuracy
(July 13, 2018) — Michael Klare is senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association and the author, most recently, of The Race for What’s Left: The Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources. He just wrote the piece “What Trump’s Critics Are Missing About the NATO Summit” for The Nation.
Reuters reports in “Trump says ‘ultimate deal’ with Putin would be world without nuclear weapons” that: “Asked what would be the best possible result from his meeting with Putin, Trump said: ‘What would be the ultimate? Let’s see. No more nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, no more wars, no more problems, no more conflicts. . . . That would be my ultimate.'”
David Cortright is director of policy studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He said today: “If Trump is serious about an ‘ultimate deal’ with Putin to get rid of nuclear weapons, he should come to Helsinki with an offer to cut US nuclear weapons in half immediately and call Putin’s bluff. He could dust off the formula for the elimination of all nuclear weapons that Reagan and Gorbachev almost concluded at Reykjavik in October 1986.
To show he’s serious Trump should suspend the current so-called ‘modernization’ of US nuclear systems, following the model of the suspension of military exercises he ordered for US troops in South Korea in his summit with Kim Jong-un.”
Alice Slater is the New York Director of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and serves on the Coordinating Committee of World Beyond War. She recently wrote “Watch Out World: Peace May be Breaking Out,” which states that the “new Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons celebrated its first birthday on July 7 when 122 nations voted a year ago in the UN General Assembly to ban the bomb, just as we have banned biological and chemical weapons.
The new ban treaty shattered the establishment consensus that the proper way to avoid nuclear catastrophe was to follow the endless step by step path of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, now 50 years old this month, which has only led to nuclear weapons forever.”
Last year, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons won the Nobel Peace Prize, but the effort has been opposed by both the US and Russian governments. (See below: “McNamara: US a Violator of Proliferation Treaty.”)
Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton are with the National Security Archive and have worked on declassified documents on a wide variety of security issues. See their “Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986 and the Road to Reykjavik,” which notes:
“Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s radical proposal in January 1986 to abolish nuclear weapons by the year 2000 met with derision on the part of many US officials, who treated it as pure propaganda, but was welcomed by President Reagan . . . .
“According to senior advisor Paul Nitze, Reagan’s first reaction to the Gorbachev letter after Nitze and [Secretary of State George] Shultz briefed him was, ‘Why wait until the year 2000 to eliminate all nuclear weapons?’ At the same time, Reagan remarked again and again on the fact that Gorbachev had set an actual date, which made the proposal sound more realistic . . . .
“There was a considerable difference of opinion within the administration: from Shultz arguing for engaging Gorbachev and his program, to [Secretary of Defense Caspar] Weinberger claiming that it was just an effort to ‘divert energy’ and to kill SDI. Shultz devotes several pages of his memoir to the internal debates.
“His account describes Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle as the most hard-line opponent: ‘Perle declared to the Senior Arms Control Group in mid-January that the president’s dream of a world without nuclear weapons — which Gorbachev had picked up — was a disaster, a total delusion.’
“According to Shultz, Perle opposed even holding an NSC discussion of how to respond to Gorbachev ‘because then the president would direct his arms controllers to come up with a program to achieve that result.'”
What Trump’s Critics Are Missing About the NATO Summit
Michael T. Klare / The Nation
Trump’s nutty antics, as usual, dominate the headlines — while very little is being said about the alliance’s actual role in the world.
(July 11, 2018) — For many in Washington and Europe’s major capitals, Donald Trump’s attendance at the two-day NATO summit now under way in Brussels is being watched with deep apprehension, given his widely voiced complaints over NATO members’ alleged failure to pay their fair share of combined expenses and his seeming indifference to the alliance’s presumed role as the bedrock of US defense policy. Trump renewed his recriminations of NATO laggards upon arriving in Brussels, saying, “The United States is spending far too much and other countries are not paying enough.”
With a Trump-Putin encounter coming a few days later, many are arguing that failure to bolster NATO’s resolve could give Putin the opening he needs to wrest concessions from Trump. A broad cross section of political leaders, including many prominent Democrats, therefore called on Trump to be nice to our NATO partners, reaffirm America’s ties to the alliance, and draw on this collective spirit to pummel Putin when the two heads of state meet in Helsinki. From the mass media, then, we see only two potential roles for Trump at NATO: as spoiler or as savior. But are these the only options we can envision?
Until now, most of the conversation regarding Trump’s visit has focused on the military spending of NATO members, with very little devoted to NATO’s actual mission. Trump insists that every alliance member commit at least 2 percent of its gross domestic product to defense — a target currently met by only eight of NATO’s 29 members: the United States, Britain, Greece, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.
The fact that most member states — including such heavyweights as France and Germany — have not reached that level has led him to bad-mouth the alliance, claiming that its members are freeloading on US taxpayers. “I’ll tell NATO: ‘You’ve got to start paying your bills,'” Trump had declared at a recent rally in Montana, where he complained that Americans were “the schmucks that are paying for the whole thing.”
NATO’s numerous defenders in Washington and elsewhere claim that other members are on track to reach the 2 percent target and that the Europeans contribute to alliance security in other ways, for example by hosting US and allied forces on their territory. Some members have contributed to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and US-led missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
None of this has satisfied Trump, who seems obsessed with the (essentially meaningless) 2 percent spending level. “Over the last year, about $40 billion more has been given by other countries to help NATO,” Trump told reporters in Brussels, “but that’s not nearly enough.”
Trump also focused particular ire on Germany, Europe’s leading economy and a favorite White House target on trade issues. The president appears particularly incensed that Germany continues to import natural gas from Russia (so as to reduce its reliance on coal and nuclear power), while holding the line on sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea. “I think it’s very sad when Germany makes a massive oil and gas deal with Russia,” he said in Brussels, while “we’re protecting Germany.”
In all of this, however, very little is being said, by any party to this debate, about NATO’s actual role in the current world. Most such conversations begin with the assertion that, as stated by Madeleine Albright and 15 former foreign ministers in a July 9 letter to Trump, “Today, NATO is the world’s most successful military alliance.” And, as noted by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in a July 8 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, “Together, the alliance’s 29 countries represent half the world’s economic and military might.”
But what is all this power being used for? Aside from support for those failed US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO’s main day-to-day activity in recent years has been to confront and confine a newly resurgent Russia in Eastern Europe. At a previous summit, held in Wales in September 2014 (just a few months after Russia annexed Crimea), NATO leaders adopted a “Readiness Action Plan” intended to beef up alliance defenses on its eastern periphery and take other steps intended to counter Russian moves in the region.
The plan’s aim, the summit communiquÃ© stated, is to reassure NATO’s front-line members “that our Allied forces maintain the adequate readiness and coherence needed to conduct NATO’s full range of missions, including deterring aggression against NATO Allies and demonstrating preparedness to defend NATO territory.”
At a subsequent summit, in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO leaders agreed to take this plan further, by stationing, on a rotating basis (to deflect any Russian claim that it was creating “permanent” bases), a reinforced combat battalion plus supporting units in each of the Baltic republics plus Poland. Those battalions are now being deployed, sparking Russian cries of “destabilizing” moves by NATO on its borders and prompting the movement of additional Russian forces into the region.
All these moves have increased tensions in the region and led to periodic close encounters between NATO and Russian ships and planes operating in the tightly constrained air- and sea-spaces around the Baltic Sea. Even worse, they have been accompanied by talk in the West of increased Russian reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the increased NATO military presence on Russia’s borders, and corresponding calls on the United States to bolster its own nuclear arsenal in the face of those alleged Russian threats.
This stance became official US policy in February, when the Trump administration released its Nuclear Posture Review, authorizing the development and deployment of so-called “low-yield” nuclear weapons to deter Russia from using similar munitions in Europe or, if necessary, retaliate for any such use with equivalent attacks. (Needless to say, most nuclear analysts contend that any use of nuclear weapons by a major power, even those deemed “low-yield,” is likely to spark retaliation with ordinary, city-busting weapons, making the very concept ludicrous.)
If Pentagon officials and NATO’s other boosters would have their way, the summit in Brussels would be devoted to those issues, not the matter of military-spending levels or other (to them) distractions. Indeed, going into the summit, the alliance’s senior military officials were discussing how they could further build up NATO’s capabilities along the eastern front and better counter any improvements in Russian weaponry. Given that Moscow can be expected to compensate for any increase in NATO’s front-line capabilities, we appear headed for a dangerous arms race on Europe’s east-west border — not unlike the one experienced at the height of the Cold War.
This being the case, what we really need from Trump and other senior officials at the Brussels summit is a clear-headed reconsideration of NATO’s current strategy, with its emphasis on confronting Russia at every point from northern Scandinavia and the Baltic region to the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus.
This does not mean acquiescing to provocative moves by the Russians, but rather asking whether diplomacy, conflict-avoidance measures, and arms control are being given the priority they deserve. A less confrontational stance by NATO — including an announcement that it will not carry out provocative moves of its own, such as expanding membership to Ukraine or Georgia — could eliminate the need for spending increases or costly new weapons systems — nuclear or otherwise.
NATO can play a useful role in Europe, helping to defuse intra-Western tensions and buttressing human rights at a time of rising nationalism and xenophobia. If its mission were reconfigured for today’s needs, the alliance could become a key foundation for European peace and stability. But for that to happen, NATO would have to abandon its grandiose anti-Russian mandate and its continuing reliance on nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, these are not the kinds of issues Trump will raise at the summit.
Michael T. Klare, The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC.
Trump Says ‘Ultimate Deal’ with Putin
Would Be World Without Nuclear Weapons
BRUSSELS (July 12, 2018) — US President Donald Trump on Thursday said the best agreement he could have with Russian President Vladimir Putin would be one where there would be no nuclear weapons in the world.
Asked what would be the best possible result from his meeting with Putin, Trump said: “What would be the ultimate? Let’s see. No more nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, no more wars, no more problems, no more conflicts. … That would be my ultimate.”
Trump is due to meet with Putin on Monday in Helsinki.
McNamara: US a Violator of Proliferation Treaty
The Institute for Public Accuracy
(July 6, 2009) — President Obama emphasized proliferation issues at his news conference with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev today.
Robert McNamara, who died today, is most noted for presiding over much of the escalation of the Vietnam War during the Johnson administration; he was also an increasingly outspoken advocate on nuclear non-proliferation.
In 2005, former Secretary of Defense McNamara told the Institute for Public Accuracy:
“The NPT was signed by a president. It was submitted to the Senate; it was ratified by the Senate. It is today the law of the land. The US government is not adhering to Article VI of the NPT and we show no signs of planning to adhere to its requirements to move forward with the elimination — not reduction, but elimination — of nuclear weapons. That was the agreement, these other countries would not develop nuclear weapons and the nuclear powers would move to elimination. We are violating that.”
One of the last major pieces written by McNamara was “Apocalypse Soon” in Foreign Policy.
In 2005, Janathan Granoff (president of the Global Security Institute) moderated an event at the United Nations that featured McNamara as a speaker. At one point, McNamara stated:
“US and NATO nuclear policies today are immoral, illegal, [militarily] unnecessary, very very dangerous in terms of potential accidental or inadvertent use and destructive of the non-proliferation regime.”
Jacquiline Cabasso, executive director of the Western States Legal Foundation (which monitors nuclear weapons policy) [added]:
“With respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), McNamara was right. The treaty requires the nuclear weapon states to negotiate in good faith to eliminate — not merely reduce — their nuclear arsenals.
“Today’s announcement that the US and Russia will negotiate a modest follow-on treaty to START reestablishes the norm of verification in nuclear arms reductions, but leaves in place objectively huge arsenals for years to come, fails to address key security differences that are likely to impede meaningful nuclear disarmament in the future, and does nothing to reduce the central role of nuclear weapons in either country’s national security policies.
“In contrast, the US Conference of Mayors, at their recent annual meeting, unanimously adopted a resolution calling on President Obama to announce at the 2010 NPT Review Conference the initiation of good faith multilateral negotiations on an international agreement to abolish nuclear weapons by the year 2020.
“I’d like to give President Obama the benefit of the doubt, but if he’s serious about getting rid of nuclear weapons, he’s going to have to make a major break with the policies of both the Bush and Clinton administrations, and take on some of the most powerful and entrenched forces on earth.”
Cabasso is also US Coordinator of Mayors for Peace. She is a co-author of Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security? US Weapons of Terror, the Global Proliferation Crisis and Paths to Peace and is the author of Rhetoric vs. Reality: Elite Disarmament Proposals and Real Disarmament Prospects.
Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986 and the Road to Reykjavik
National Security Archive
Soviet nuclear abolition proposal in January 1986 welcomed by Reagan, set stage for historic Reykjavik summit
and the INF Treaty 30 years ago.
Gorbachev believed US dismissed idea as propaganda
but declassified documents show a major internal debate,
consultations with allies, serious presidential support.
WASHINGTON, DC (October 12, 2016) — Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s radical proposal in January 1986 to abolish nuclear weapons by the year 2000 met with derision on the part of many US officials, who treated it as pure propaganda, but was welcomed by President Reagan, according to declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive. The records reveal serious internal US debates, consultations with allies, and support by the president that ultimately helped produce the historic Reykjavik summit 30 years ago.
The documents posted today include Gorbachev’s abolition letter of January 14, 1986, Top Secret critical responses by the US defense secretary and by the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (“largely propaganda”), Reagan’s formal response over a month later (February 22), the minutes of a Top Secret National Security Planning Group meeting (February 3) that debated how to respond, key highly classified “OWL” and “SAGE” policy options papers produced by US officials behind the scenes, reports back from consultation missions to allies from London to Tokyo, Gorbachev’s ultimate invitation letter for the Reykjavik meeting (September 15), and the actual declassified transcripts of the Reykjavik sessions where the two leaders came close to abolishing nuclear weapons.
Transcripts covering all of the bilateral summits from 1985 to 1991 will appear next month in the new book, The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations that Ended the Cold War (Central European University Press, 2016).
Before the January 14 abolition letter, Reagan and Gorbachev had met at Geneva in November 1985 — the first summit in more than six years of heightened Cold War — where they agreed in an historic joint statement that “nuclear war can not be won and should never be fought.”
After Geneva, however, US-Soviet momentum on arms control had all but disappeared. The Gorbachev letter and the public statement that immediately followed in January 1986 took the Reagan administration by surprise and generated more than a month of internal debate before Reagan’s February response addressed only the first portion of Gorbachev’s proposal.
The documents posted below show that during this time the US administration was split between those who thought abolition was just another Soviet propaganda move and those who believed it was a serious program that needed a substantive response. The records show conclusively that President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz were in the latter camp.
The history of the Soviet abolition program dates back to the spring of 1985, according to first-hand accounts by the top officials who developed the proposal. Soon after Gorbachev came to power in March of that year, Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev first spoke to Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kornienko and the head of the Legal and Treaty Department of the General Staff, General Nikolai Chervov, about preparing a detailed program of total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Kornienko supported the idea, and Akhromeyev gave orders to selected military experts to study the issues and prepare a draft. Very few people knew about the program until the end of 1985. Soviet arms control expert General Viktor Starodubov mentions that the planners felt the time was right to present it to Gorbachev after his meeting with Reagan in Geneva. 
According to Gorbachev’s spokesman and biographer, Andrey Grachev, the drafters of the program envisioned it in terms somewhat similar to those of the US drafters of Reagan’s “zero option” INF solution of 1981. They thought that the chances of the US side accepting abolition were close to zero, but that making the proposal would provide both strong negotiating grounds and propaganda points to their own side.
According to General Starodubov, quoted in Grachev, Akhromeyev’s reasoning was that “if by any chance the Americans accepted the idea, the Soviet side would be able to make full use of its advantage in conventional weapons.”
Gorbachev, however, saw the program differently — as an opportunity to advance the US-Soviet arms control discussion that had stalled after Geneva with a bold, radical stroke — which he thought would be acceptable to Reagan because of his strongly expressed belief in a nuclear-free world. Also, by accepting the Akhromeyev-Kornienko drafted initiative, Gorbachev, according to Grachev, “trapped” his own military into supporting very deep cuts in armaments across the board. 
Gorbachev approved the abolition plan in late December 1985 and after discussion among the top leadership it became the official Soviet program with Gorbachev’s public announcement on January 15, 1986.
The program envisioned three stages. First stage: a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons (over 5 to 8 years) and an agreement to eliminate all medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Second stage: starting in 1990, Britain, France and China would join the process by freezing their arsenals, and all nuclear powers would eliminate their tactical weapons and ban nuclear testing.
Third stage: “starting in 1995, liquidation of all still remaining nuclear weapons is completed.” (Document 1) Other important elements of the Soviet program were a ban on space weapons, strict adherence to the ABM Treaty, and a nuclear testing ban. Because of the lack of immediate response, Gorbachev always believed that his program was never taken seriously in the West, and had been dismissed as propaganda.
For example, on April 4, 1986, Gorbachev complained to a visiting delegation of US congressmen that “the United States decided to hide behind the opinions of its allies — West European countries and Japan, otherwise, it would be hard for them to justify their negative position . . .. We are often accused of making propaganda proposals. Well, if it is propaganda, then why not catch Gorbachev at his word, why not test his intentions by accepting our proposal?” (Document 23)
In fact, recently declassified documents show that President Reagan’s initial reaction to the proposals, according to his diaries, was positive, not dismissive. He launched a serious and thorough process within the administration to study the feasibility of the Soviet proposal and ways to respond, given his own interest in nuclear abolition.
On January 15, after a long meeting with Shultz and national security adviser John Poindexter, he wrote that “we’d be hard put to explain how we could turn it down,” and on February 3, after the NSPG meeting devoted to the Soviet proposal, Reagan wrote in his diary: “Some wanted to tag it as publicity stunt. I said no. Lets say we share their overall goals & now want to work out the details. If it is a publicity stunt it will be revealed by them.”  (In other words, the American president and Soviet leader were thinking along identical lines.)
The minutes of the NSPG meeting show a harder Reagan line than he took in his diary, but this was perhaps for the benefit of the half of his audience that opposed any positive response. (Document 10)
According to senior advisor Paul Nitze, Reagan’s first reaction to the Gorbachev letter after Nitze and Shultz briefed him was, “Why wait until the year 2000 to eliminate all nuclear weapons?”  At the same time, Reagan remarked again and again on the fact that Gorbachev had set an actual date, which made the proposal sound more realistic.
As noted, there was a considerable difference of opinion within the administration: from Shultz arguing for engaging Gorbachev and his program, to Weinberger claiming that it was just an effort to “divert energy” and to kill SDI. Shultz devotes several pages of his memoir to the internal debates. His account describes Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle as the most hard-line opponent:
“Perle declared to the Senior Arms Control Group in mid-January that the president’s dream of a world without nuclear weapons — which Gorbachev had picked up — was a disaster, a total delusion.”
According to Shultz, Perle opposed even holding an NSC discussion of how to respond to Gorbachev “because then the president would direct his arms controllers to come up with a program to achieve that result.” 
Most eloquently, Shultz quotes his own speech to the State Department’s arms control group on January 17, 1986:
“I know that many of you and others around here oppose the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. You have tried your ideas out in front of the president from the outset, and I have pointed out the dangers, too. The president of the United States doesn’t agree with you, and he has said so on several very public occasions both before and since the last election. He thinks it’s a hell of a good idea.
“And it’s a political hot button. We need to work on what a world without nuclear weapons would mean to us and what additional steps would have to accompany such a dramatic change. The president has wanted all along to get rid of nuclear weapons. The British, French, Dutch, Belgians, and all of you in the Washington arms control community are trying to talk him out of it. The idea can potentially be a plus for us: the Soviet Union is a superpower only because it is a nuclear and ballistic missile superpower.” 
Nitze describes the deliberations as follows: “The President and his principal advisers were in disagreement, particularly Shultz and Weinberger, over the response to Gorbachev’s January 15 letter. The rest of the bureaucracy, unaware of these high-level discussions, continued the debate on a battle ground already in disarray, which soon degenerated into a free-for-all between the Pentagon and State Department.”
In addition to internal deliberations, which produced two NSPG meetings and two National Security Decision Directives, Nitze and Ambassador Ed Rowny were sent to consult with the allies in Europe and in Asia, respectively. Both brought back negative views, arguing that responding favorably to the Soviet program would be too costly in terms of NATO solidarity.
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was strongly against any idea that would eliminate the US nuclear umbrella and, in her view, undermine deterrence. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany was an outlier, supporting “both the goal of total elimination and zero/zero INF in Europe.” (Document 14)
In the end, the Reagan administration did not dismiss the abolition proposal as propaganda, but came to the conclusion that they were not ready for a program of such a scope. Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev on February 22, 1986, engaged only part of the proposed first stage of abolition — the elimination of intermediate-range missiles.
The response and the sense of lost opportunity on the part of some observers was summed up by US Representative Dante Fascell in his conversation with Gorbachev in April 1986: “the reality is such that the United States is not ready, for some reason — either political or military, I don’t know — they are not capable to make the big leap, which you are calling for, at this time.” (Document 22)
Although the Soviet side was dissatisfied with the US response, the interaction did push both sides to work harder on negotiating positions and think about deep disarmament for the next summit. (Document 25) In fact active Soviet diplomacy and the American effort to use the opportunities offered by Gorbachev resulted in a comprehensive review of the entirety of US arms control policy and long-term nuclear strategy in preparation for the next summit, a process which continued throughout spring and summer 1986 (Documents 26 and 27). ”
Meanwhile, the Reagan administration actively engaged the Soviets in all negotiating formats. As a result, the Soviets accepted the US “zero option” on INF, agreed to radical verification measures, and started internal discussions on dramatic reductions in conventional weapons.
Gorbachev’s January 1986 initiative and the US response laid the first paver on the road to the most dramatic summit in US-Soviet history — at Reykjavik in October 1986 — which despite its failure prepared the ground for the INF Treaty signed in 1987.
Gorbachev later described Reykjavik as a summit of “Shakespearean passions,” which are particularly evident in the final session transcript, with the astounding agreement to abolish all nuclear weapons, disagreement over constraining strategic defense research to the labs, repeated offers from Reagan to share SDI with the Soviets — a personal plea from Reagan that Gorbachev rejected (“they will call me a fool in Moscow”) — and two tight-lipped leaders stalking out of the summit.
The dramatic details may be found in Chapter 2 of The Last Superpower Summits, and in the authors’ package of key declassified documents from both sides, presented to Gorbachev at the 20th anniversary of the summit in 2006.
 Viktor Starodubov, Ot razoruzheniya k kapitulyatsii (From Disarmament to Capitulation), (Moscow: Veche, 2007), pp. 261-262. See also the joint Akhromeyev-Kornienko memoir, Glazamy marshala y diplomata (Moscow: Mezdunarodnye otnoshinya, 1992), Chapter 3.
 Andrey Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), pp. 66-69
The Reagan Diaries, Volume II November 1985-January 1989, Edited by Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), pp. 562, 568
 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 422
 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner’s, 1993), pp. 699-705).
 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 701.
 Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, “The Reykjavik File: Previously Secret US and Soviet Documents on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 203, posted October 13, 2006, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm
Posted in accordance with Title 17, Section 107, for noncommercial, educational purposes.