ACTION: Congress Calls for More Nukes! Nov. 16 Webinar

November 16th, 2023 - by The Los Alamos Study Group

ACTION ALERT: Congressional Commission OKs
Massive Modernization of Nuclear Weapons
The Los Alamos Study Group

(November 15, 2023) — There is lots of bilateral support for “weapons modernization,” thanks to the War Party and the Biden neocons who seem determined to fight both Russia and China.

Full speed ahead to nuclear war.

This Thursday, November 16, from 6-8 pm Mountain Time, the Los Alamos Study Group will host a nationally-webcast panel and audience discussion of this new strategic proposal. Panelists will include Peter Kuznick, who will speak on how this plan is being received internationally, Steven Starr, and Greg Mello.

ACTION: To join the meeting by Zoom, register in advance at this link: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZclcemgpzIrH9GVf3g3ImNz1s8m1W6ilRoV. After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the meeting.

Final Report of the Congressional Commission on
the Strategic Posture of the US
 (October 2023)

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission recommends fully and urgently executing the US nuclear modernization POR, which includes replacement of all US nuclear delivery systems, modernization of their warheads, comprehensive modernization of US nuclear command, control, and communications, and recapitalizing the nuclear enterprise infrastructure at the DOD and DOE/NNSA.

At the same time, the current modernization program should be supplemented to ensure US nuclear strategy remains effective in a two-nuclear-peer environment. Modifications to both strategic nuclear forces and theater nuclear forces are urgently necessary.

The US strategic nuclear force posture should be modified in order to:

  • `  Address the larger number of targets. The Chinese nuclear threat is no longer a “lesser included case” of the Russian nuclear threat, resulting in the need to deter and achieve objectives against China and Russia simultaneously should deterrence fail.
  • `  Address the possibility that China will field large scale counterforce-capable missile forces that pose a threat to US strategic nuclear forces on par with the threat Russia poses to those forces today.
  • `  Assure the United States continues to avoid reliance on executing ICBM launch under attack to retain an effective deterrent; and
  • `  Account for advances in Russian and Chinese IAMD.
  • The following strategic nuclear force posture modifications should be pursued with urgency:
    • `  Prepare to upload some or all of the nation’s hedge warheads;
    • `  Plan to deploy the Sentinel ICBM in a MIRVed228 configuration;
    • `  Increase the planned number of deployed Long-Range Standoff Weapons;
    • `  Increase the planned number of B-21 bombers and the tankers an expanded force would require;
    • `  Increase the planned production of Columbia SSBNs and their Trident ballistic missile systems, and accelerate development and deployment of D5LE2;
    • `  Pursue the feasibility of fielding some portion of the future ICBM force in a road mobile configuration;
    • `  Accelerate efforts to develop advanced countermeasures to adversary IAMD; and
    • `  Initiate planning and preparations for a portion of the future bomber fleet to be on continuous alert status, in time for the B-21 Full Operational Capability (FOC) date.

A comprehensive set of risk-mitigating actions across US nuclear forces must also be executed to ensure that delays in modernization programs or early age-out of currently deployed systems do not result in militarily significant shortfalls in deployed nuclear capability. The Commission recommends that set of urgent actions include, at a minimum:

    • `  Exercise upload of ICBM and SLBM warheads on existing deployed systems;
    • `  Develop plans and procedures to “re-convert” SLBM launchers and B-52 bombers that were rendered incapable of launching a nuclear weapon under New START; and
    • `  Provide sufficient funding to ensure existing deployed systems, such as NC3 and Ohio-class SSBNs, can operate past their currently planned retirement dates, as technically feasible.

US theater nuclear force posture should be urgently modified in order to:

    • `  Provide the President a range of militarily effective nuclear response options to deter or counter Chinese or Russian limited nuclear use in theater;
    • `  Address the need for US theater nuclear forces deployed or based in the Asia-Pacific theater;
    • `  Compensate for any shortfall in US and allied non-nuclear capabilities in a sequential or simultaneous two-theater conflict against China and Russia;
    • `  Address advances in Chinese and Russian IAMD; and
    • `  Address allied concerns regarding extended deterrence.